Abstract-This paper is concerned with cyber-physical attack detection problem in networked control systems subject to limited communication bandwidth. This constraint arises when an attack detection system is located at a remote site and so the required signals, measurement output and control signals, need to be transmitted over a digital communication channel. Therefore, data before being sent to the remote site must be encoded and converted from analog signals to digital signals by using quantizer. A quantizer maps the amount of information from a continuous space to a finite set which is compatible with the limited communication bandwidth. Considering the quantized measurement output, a detection algorithm by means of a set-membership filtering approach will be proposed. The algorithm consists of a prediction ellipsoid set and an estimation ellipsoid set updated with the quantized measurement output. The detection method depends on the existence of intersection between two sets computed by the filter. Simulation results for some possible physical and cyber attacks are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
I. INTRODUCTION
A networked control system (NCS) is such a system whose components, i.e. controllers, sensors, and actuators, are implemented distributively. In an NCS, information among system components is exchanged via a shared communication network. As a result, an NCS has several advantages over traditional control systems such as low installation and maintenance costs, elimination of unnecessary wiring, high reliability, and more flexibility in upgrading the system with new components [1] .
However, the use of communication networks usually introduces some challenging issues. To mention a few, the growing trend towards using pervasive computing systems, such as the Internet and wireless communication, leads NCSs to become dramatically vulnerable to attacks that violate both their physical infrastructure and the communication layer [2] . Due to the crucial role of NCSs in industrial control systems, security of NCSs needs to be properly addressed to ensure that the system is operating in a safe manner.
Furthermore, in NCSs some communication issues are induced by the network due to wireless connections. Generally speaking, three common induced communication issues include network-induced delay, packet dropout and quantization effect [1] . As this paper is concerned with the problem of attack detection using quantized measurement output, quantization effects on the performance of the proposed attack detection system is the only network-induced communication issue considered in this study.
Signal quantization is a natural phenomenon in digital control systems and it is inevitable in NCSs due to the widely use of digital computing technology. In NCSs, sensing data must be encoded by transforming analog signals to digital signals before being transmitted to a remote site via a network [3] . As design of the controller is beyond the scope of this paper, the controller is considered to be at the same site as the plant and, thus, providing the physical plant with a known control signal. As quantization may result in limited communication bandwidth and unpredictable behaviour, quantization may have some effects on the performance of the attack detection system considered to be in the remote site of an NCS in this paper.
Quantized state estimation in NCSs has received considerable attention. The set-valued state estimation problem is discussed for continuous-time systems in [4] . They considered that the observation must be transmitted via a communication channel with a limited capacity. The proposed state estimation utilizes uniform quantization of the state of the system. In [5] , a reset state estimator is presented to improve the position estimation for motion control systems with measurement output quantization. The reset estimator updates the estimated state using the exact information obtained from the uniform-typed quantizer. In [6] , the state estimation problem is investigated for linear discrete-time systems using quantized measurements by a logarithmic quantizer. The problem of state estimation in quantized feedback control systems is studied in [7] . They proposed a new state estimation method for a discrete-time system in which the measurement output is uniformly quantized. In [8] , a reliable tracking controller is proposed for discrete time-varying systems subject to timedelays, quantization effects and parameter uncertainties. Setmembership filtering method is used to estimate the state of the system in which the measurement output is quantized based on the logarithmic quantizer. However, up to now, the attack detection problem in NCSs with limited communication bandwidth has not yet received adequate attention. The impact of the communication capacity constraint on the attack detection performance should be further discussed.
Motivated by the discussion above, it is the objective of this paper to design an algorithm by means of setmembership filtering techniques to detect cyber-physical attacks into NCSs subject to limited communication bandwidth. First, a recursive convex optimization algorithm that provides a region of state estimate where the true state resides despite the presence of limited communication bandwidth is proposed. This algorithm estimates the state in two steps: a prediction step and a measurement update step. Then, two sub-algorithms are provided to detect attacks in NCSs subject to quantized measurement output caused by the limited communication bandwidth. The idea to detect attacks introduced in the sub-algorithms depends on the existence of intersection between the prediction ellipsoid set and the estimation ellipsoid set updated with the quantized measurement output. If there exists no intersection between the prediction ellipsoid set and the estimation ellipsoid set updated with the previous quantized measurement output, control signal is compromised by attacks; the sensor (measurement output) signal is violated by attacks if there is no intersection between the prediction ellipsoid set and the estimation ellipsoid set updated at the current time instant. The so-called "zoomin/zoom-out" uniform quantized strategy is employed to model the quantizer.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND FORMULATION
let us consider the framework of an NCS as shown in Fig.1 . The concept depicted on Fig.1 is equally applicable to both open and closed control system configurations. Consequently, Fig.1 is only focused onto the link between a sensor, the controllers output and the attack detection system. In this framework, the attack detection system is located at the remote site. Therefore, the measurement output and the control signal are both sent to the attack detection system via a communication network. The propagation of the output of the attack detection system throughout the control system is not considered in this paper. Instead, it has just been considered as an alarm signal. It is assumed that the communication network transmitting data to the attack detection system has a limited communication bandwidth. However, design of the controller is not discussed in this paper and the control signal is considered as a constant-value signal, therefore, there is no need for the control signal to be quantized.
Attacks on an NCS can be practically considered either attacks directly on physical components (physical attack), i.e. sensors and controllers, or attacks on the communication network that transmits data to receivers located at the remote site (cyber attack). If a physical attack is applied into controllers and/or sensors (attack points A 1 and/or A 2 ), the control signal, u k , and/or quantized measurement output, y 
A physical plant considered in the proposed framework, Fig.1 , can be developed in a mathematical way as a discrete time-varying system in the form of
where x k ∈ R n is the system state; u k ∈ R l is the known deterministic input; y k ∈ R m is the measurement output; A k , B k , C k , D k , and F k are known time-varying matrices with appropriate dimensions; w k ∈ R r and v k ∈ R p are the known-but-bounded process and measurement noises, respectively (totally known as system noises), which are assumed to belong to the following specified ellipsoid sets
where
0 are known matrices with compatible dimensions.
The initial state x 0 is assumed to belong to a given ellipsoid set X 0|0 (x 0|0 , E 0|0 )
wherex 0|0 is an estimate of x 0 , which is assumed to be given,
0 is a known matrix and
Due to the limitation of the communication bandwidth, a quantizer is considered at the plant site to transmit a finite number of codewords. In this paper, the "zoom-in/zoom-out" uniform quantized strategy is adopted in the coding/decoding communication [9] . The dynamics of the coder/decoder is considered as
where the quantizer function is
The coder/decoder state ξ k+1 contains the quantized measurement output y
Therefore, the quantized measurement output satisfies the recursive relation
The function Q(·) is defined by
(10) where { ∈ N : 0 ≤ ≤ L − 1}, and
where k in ∈ (0, 1) is the zoom-in parameter and k out ∈ (1, +∞) is the zoom-out parameter, L is the number of finite levels.
Remark 1: Since, the error between the current measurement output and the previous quantized measurement output, i.e. y k+1 − y Q k , is much less than the value of the current measurement output y k+1 , a quantization of the error can reduce the transmitted rate. Therefore, the quantization strategy in (9) is a quantization of the error, rather than the current measurement output. The zoom in-zoom out quantizer can adjust the transmitted rate at a certain range by changing the scaling parameters k in and k out .
Remark 2: Assuming
Then, if k in and k out in (11) are appropriately scaled, then the quantizer in (10) will never be saturated. For the unsaturated quantizer,
In this paper, a strategy presented to detect cyber-physical attacks is based on an ellipsoidal set-membership filtering approach. This approach involves two ellipsoid sets: a prediction ellipsoid set and an estimation ellipsoid set updated with the quantized measurement output. An attack can be detected if there exists no intersection between the two sets. This strategy will be refereed as a detection of cyberphysical attacks that compromise sensor measurement and control signal data in an NCS with limited communication bandwidth using a quantized set-membership filtering method.
III. ATTACK DETECTION USING QUANTIZED SET-MEMBERSHIP FILTERING
In this section, a quantized set-membership filtering method is designed for the proposed cyber-physical attack detection problem.
A. Prediction Ellipsoid Set
The prediction filter is considered in the form of
wherex k|k is an estimation of the state x k ; G k is the filter parameter to be determined. In the first step, a previous state estimation ellipsoid at instant k is assumed to be known and belong to a set X k|k (x k|k , E k|k ) with the centrex k|k and the shape matrix E k|k , i.e.
where E k|k E T k|k = P k|k , and for some z such that z ≤ 1. In this step, our goal is to obtain the prediction ellipsoid set X k+1|k :
For the system (1)- (2), suppose that the state x k belongs to its state estimation ellipsoid (15). Then the one-step ahead state x k+1 resides in its state prediction ellipsoid (16) for any value of the system noises belong to their specified sets, if there exist P k+1|k > 0, G k , τ 1 ≥ 0, and τ 2 ≥ 0 such that the following recursive matrix inequality holds.
Consider the system (1)-(2) and the prediction filter (14). As the size of the ellipsoid can be measured by means of the sum of squared semiaxes lengths, which is given by Tr(P) 1 , the convex optimization approach is applied to determine an optimal ellipsoid. P k+1|k is obtained by solving the following optimization problem:
Tr(P k+1|k ) subject to (17) (18)
B. Estimation Ellipsoid Set Updated with Current Quantized Measurement
A filter based on the current quantized measurement is considered for the system (1)-(2), which is in the form of
where L k+1 is the filter parameter to be determined.
1 Tr(P) denotes trace of P.
At the measurement update step, the prediction ellipsoid set X k+1|k is given by (16) for the state x k+1 , which can be written as
where E k+1|k E T k+1|k = P k+1|k , and for some z such that z ≤ 1. Our objective is to update this prediction set with the one yielding from the current quantized measurement y Q k+1 . Thus, the updated ellipsoid set should satisfy the condition
k+1|k+1 (x k+1 −x k+1|k+1 ) ≤ 1 (21) whenever the equality (output constraint)
holds for some z ≤ 1, v k+1 ∈ V k+1 and ∆ k ≤ 
and N k+1 such that the following recursive matrix inequality holds.
k+1 , τ 5 I) Corollary 2: Consider the system (1)-(2) and filter (19). Applying the convex optimization approach, an optimal ellipsoid can be determined. P k+1|k+1 is obtained by solving the following optimization problem:
Tr(P k+1|k+1 ) subject to (23) (24)
C. Attach Detection Algorithm
The algorithm that recursively computes the prediction and estimation ellipsoid sets is summarized as Algorithm 1. Based on the intersection between these two ellipsoid sets, two sub-algorithms are defined to detect attacks that violate the control signal and the sensor measurement. Given an initial ellipsoid X 0|0 (x 0|0 , E 0|0 ), the current value of input u0, recursive times N , and set k = 0. Letx ← x 0|0 , E ← E 0|0 , u ← u0.
Prediction:
1) Calculate P k+1|k and G k by solving the optimization problem (18). Obtain the matrix E k+1|k by means of the Cholesky factorization of P k+1|k :
. 2) Calculate the centre of the prediction ellipsoidx k+1|k by (14).
Sub-Algorithm 1a: Diagnosis Attack on Controller Data
There is no attack 2) If X k|k X k+1|k = ∅.
Indicate attack, and then
1) Calculate the quantized measurement output, y Q k+1 , from (9). 2) Calculate P k+1|k+1 and L k+1 by solving the optimization problem (24).
Obtain the new E k+1|k+1 by the Cholesky factorization of P k+1|k+1 . 3) Calculate the centre of the updated estimation ellipsoidx k+1|k+1 by (19).
Sub-Algorithm 1b: Diagnosis Attack on Sensor Data
There is no attack 2) If X k+1|k+1 X k+1|k = ∅.
Loop
If k == N then Exit, Else k ← k + 1 and Goto Prediction step
IV. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
In this section, a maneuvering target tracking system with a constant-acceleration input model [10] is considered as
where the components of the state
are the position and the velocity; u k is the commanded acceleration; w k represents a process noise which belongs to a specified ellipsoid set. Since the position is measured by radar, the measurement is described as
and v k is the radar measurement noise which is confined to a specified ellipsoid set.
In the simulation, the control signal is considered as the constant commanded acceleration u k which is set to 2 m/s 2 . w k and v k are chosen as 0.5 sin(2k) and 0.2 sin(20k), respectively. Q k = 0.3 and R k = 0.1. The initial state is set as x 0 = 3 2 T , which belongs to the ellipsoid
T , and P 0|0 = [ 50 0 0 50 ]. The quantizer parameters k in and k out are set to 0.7 and 11, respectively; the initial scale factor is considered as f 0 = 8, and the quantization level is L = 16.
To perform a successful attack by an attacker, it is assumed that an attacker has knowledge of the accurate values of the control signal u k and the sensor measurement output y k in real time, and he is also capable of violating the integrity of the sensor measurement and control signal and modifying the true values of y k and u k to arbitrary ones.
A. Physical Attacks on Controller and Sensor
A physical attack can be directly applied to physical components and perturb the system dynamics. An attacker can access to the plant site and compromise the controller and the sensor to introduce fake control and measurement output commands. The physical attack applied on the controller (attack point A 1 shown in Fig.1 ), which changes F k in (1), can be modeled asF
and the physical attack applied on the sensor (attack point A 2 shown in Fig.1) , which changes C k in (2), can be modeled asC
B. Bias Injection Attack on Control Signal and Replay Attack on Sensor Data
The replay attack consists of two phases: (1) the attacker starts to record sequences of data from sensors' communication channels without entering any input to the system. (2) the attacker replays the recorded data to the system [11] .
An attacker can record quantized sensor measurement data from k i till k r with the window size of τ = k r − k i in the first phase. Then, in the second phase, the attacker replays the recorded data to the system from k = k r + 1 till the end on the attack at k = k f . This attack (attack point A 4 shown in Fig.1 ) can be modeled as
Thus, the quantized sensor measurement output affected by the attack isỹ
In the bias injection attack, the attacker injects a constant bias in the system [11] . The bias injection attack on the control signal (attack point A 3 shown in Fig.1) can be modeled as
where δ u is a constant value injected by the attacker. Therefore, the control signal's data affected by the attack is
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The simulation results are obtained under Matlab 8.6 with YALMIP and the solver Sdpt 3 during 50 sampling steps. The simulated attacks are applied from step k = 20 to step k = 35.
A. Physical and Bias Injection Attacks on Controller
In this section, first, the attacker applies a physical attack on the controller to provide the plant with a fake control Step, k Figs. 2a and 3a show the sequences of the intersection between the prediction ellipsoid set and the estimation ellipsoid set updated with the previous quantized measurement output 2 . As the physical and bias injection attacks start at k = 20, the centre of the prediction ellipsoid set (14) is affected by the attacks; however the previous updated estimation ellipsoid set is not affected by the attacks as it is calculated with the prediction ellipsoid set at k = 19. Therefore, it is expected from the sub-algorithm 1a that there must exist no intersection between these two sets, i.e. χ 21|20 ∩ χ 20|20 = ∅, as illustrated in Figs. 2b and 3b. 
B. Physical and Replay Attacks on Sensor
In this case, first, the attacker applies a physical attack on the sensor to change the quantized measurement output received by the attack detection, i.e. the attack point A 2 . Also, the measurement output is compromised via injecting a replay attack into the communication network between the sensor and the attack detection, i.e. the attack point A 4 . In the simulation, the attack vector that represents A 2 is modeled as A 2 = 2 0 .
Figs. 4a and 5a demonstrate the sequences of the intersection between the prediction ellipsoid set and the estimation ellipsoid set updated with the current quantized measurement output. As the physical and replay attacks start at k = 20, Step, k the prediction ellipsoid set is calculated from the quantized measurement output obtained at k = 19 when there is no attack. However, the estimation ellipsoid set is updated with the current quantized measurement output at k = 20. Therefore, it is expected from the sub-algorithm 1b that there must be no intersection between these two sets, i.e. χ 20|19 ∩ χ 20|20 = ∅, as illustrated in Figs. 4b and 5b 3 .
C. Quantization Effects
Since the proposed attack detection algorithm relies on the existence of intersection between the prediction ellipsoid set and the estimation ellipsoid set updated with the quantized measurement output, quantizing the measurement output affects the performance of the attack detection system. The proposed attack detection system can be sensitive to the quantization parameters, i.e. L, k in , and k out . Consider the physical attack on the sensor discussed in Section V-B. If the quantization error increases through decreasing the number of quantization levels from L = 16 to L = 3, the attack detection system is no longer able to detect the attack at its time of occurrence, k = 20, as shown in Fig. 6 and therefore, there is some delays to identify the attack compared with the results shown in Fig. 4a . Moreover, the proposed setmembership filter cannot recover the state of the system after the attack finishes. Therefore, there are some false alarms after step k = 36 produced by the attack detection system.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a cyber attack detection algorithm based on the ellipsoidal set-membership filtering approach in NCSs subject to the limited communication 3 the updated estimation ellipsoid at step 20 is magnified with the ratio of 10 7 . Step, k bandwidth. The algorithm consists of a prediction ellipsoid set and an estimation ellipsoid set updated with the quantized measurement output. The attack detection method relies on the intersection of the two sets. In addition, it is investigated that the uniform quantizer in the system makes the attack detection system sensitive to the quantization levels and zoom-in/zoom-out scaling parameters.
Future work would focus on considering logarithmic quantization of the measurement output. Moreover, this study can be further improved through considering a robust and resilient controller in the proposed NCS framework that uses information from the attack detection system output to mitigate effects of cyber-physical attacks on the state of the system.
